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Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and Adult Education: Structure and
Agency in the 21st Century
Davin J. Carr-Chellman
Penn State University, USA
Abstract: This paper develops a theory that interprets the philosophical schools
of American Pragmatism and Continental Postmodernism as important,
complementary resources for understanding the effects of structure and agency on
the possibilities for learning and meaning-making. This type of theory building
can provide for practitioners and scholars a useful framework for negotiating the
limited battle between self-determination and structural determination.
Introduction
In the context of planning theory, Cervero and Wilson have clarified the problems
the dichotomy of structure and agency creates for Adult Education theory (1994). They
say, “Traditional planning theories, with their emphasis on either self-determination or
structural determination, have failed to clarify what Giddens refers to as the ‘essential
recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices;’” by which they mean the
way that structure and agency are interdependent and mutually constituted. In addressing
the recursiveness of social life, their discussion of planning theory is directly relevant to
the more general concerns of my paper. They continue,
“Therefore, planning is not solely scientific, as the classical viewpoint purports. Nor is it
simply a matter of situating the planner within a context, as the naturalistic and practical
traditions suggest. Nor does the critical viewpoint provide a complete understanding,
with its emphasis on the confluence of structural forces. What is required is a theory of
human action that integrates agency and structure.”

The formulation of planning practice elucidated by Cervero and Wilson suggests
a need for adult education theory to reach beyond its traditional conceptual terrain to
provide resources for an integrative theory of human action and structural forces. This
paper proposes that the anti-foundationalist and non-dualistic lens provided by the
philosophical traditions of American Pragmatism and Continental Postmodernism can
help provide such resources.
I understand the theoretical contribution of this paper to follow the tradition of
Paulo Freire’s notion of “naming the world” (1970), a notion that through its emphasis on
dialogical conscientization makes a profound gesture toward integrating structure and
agency. By building on Freire, these two philosophical traditions can help fill a
theoretical void in the Adult Education field – the same theoretical void that Cervero and
Wilson discuss.
Adult education is, in part, about developing human agency. The lens through
which agency has been understood has for too long been oversimplified, under-theorized,
and inaccurate; characterized as either a decontextualized, ahistorical, autonomous
subject, or as a predetermined, automaton controlled by structural forces. Contemporary
philosophical literature can contribute to a more nuanced lens by circumventing the
structure and agency dichotomy: American Pragmatism as seen in William James’ radical
empiricism (1977), John Dewey’s individualism and democratic faith (1984), and George

Herbert Mead’s social behaviorism (1934); and Continental Postmodernism as seen in
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction (1979), and Foucault’s genealogy (1988) provide the
conceptual tools for adult educators to build on Freire, Giroux, Horkheimer, and Adorno
by further illuminating a rich human agent who is embodied, contextualized, and
historicized. These philosophers and the philosophical traditions emanating from them
constitute a profound challenge to the subject-centered, Cartesian, modern philosophy
that is at the heart of adult education’s traditional notions of human agency.
If we take our task as educators and researchers to be equipping learners for
engaged citizenship and deep democracy, we must be clear about the problem to be
addressed. Our first step – and one of our most important steps as well – is the analysis
of human suffering at the hands of enlightenment rationality put forth by Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. According to their
argument, we are unwittingly complicit in the demise of democratic public spheres, the
resistance to the democratic production of knowledge, and the evaporation of broad
human agency. Walker Percy – novelist and philosopher -- argues that this degradation is
the result of alienation. His argument in support of Horkheimer and Adorno leads him to
characterize humanity's self-understanding as twofold: 1) Humans can be understood as
organisms in an environment, a sociological unit, an uncultured creature, a psychological
dynamism endowed genetically like other organisms with needs and drives, who through
evolution has developed strategies for learning and surviving by means of certain
adaptive transactions with the environment; and, 2) Humans are also understood to be
somehow endowed with certain other unique properties which he does not share with
other organisms-with certain inalienable rights, reason, freedom, and an intrinsic dignityand as a consequence the highest value to which a democratic society can be committed
is the respect of the sacredness and worth of the individual (Percy 20).
Per this description, and to connect Percy with Horkheimer and Adorno’s
dialectic of enlightenment, critical pedagogy, and, consequently, the dialectic of human
agency and social structure, humanity's self-understanding is both universal and
particular (as Horkheimer and Adorno would understand those terms) and, indeed, it is
this apparently incoherent proposition that constitutes the roots of humanity's alienation.
A person is an individual, distinct and unique, yet that same person is understandable,
biologically and scientifically, only to the extent that he or she is the same as everyone
else. Science, medicine, biology, and technology – for example -- cannot speak to the
individual, if they are to live up to the standards of enlightenment rationality. As the pure
research of scientism took command of the modern mind, the individual was silenced; the
individual --the particular-- is absorbed in a world that is fabricated and, consequently, is
made impotent by an artificial integration with the universal. This kind of identity
thinking turns concrete human individuals into abstractions, constituting a subtle yet
powerful kind of violence that numbs and desensitizes our most humane capacities.
As the laws of the marketplace take precedence over the laws of the
state as guardians of the public good, politics is increasingly removed from
power. The state offers little help in mediating the interface between the
advance of capital and its rapacious commercial interests, on the one hand,
and those non-commodified interests and nonmarket spheres that create the
political, economic, and social conditions vital for critical citizenship and
democratic public life on the other. Within the prevailing discourse of
neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no
vocabulary for political or social transformation, no collective vision, no

social agency to challenge the privatization and commercialization of
schooling. . . . In the midst of this concerted attack on the public, the market
driven consumer juggernaut continues to mobilize desires in the interest of
producing market identities and market relationships that ultimately appear
as, Theodor Adorno once put it, nothing less than ‘a prohibition on thinking
itself’” (Giroux 2001, xxii).

Giroux describes with appropriate urgency the overwhelming evidence that our
collective sense of agency is greatly impoverished by our current social structure. The
ideology of technical and enlightenment rationality becomes oppressive as our options
for human agency in the early 21st Century become limited to consumerism as opposed to
creating meaning through non-commercial values such as empathy, compassion, love,
and solidarity.
Learning is a non-dialectical process
While providing a powerful critique of the contradictions of enlightenment
rationality and an accurate analysis of its negative effects on human agency, critical
theory and dialectical, immanent critique is limited in its effectiveness for creating an
epistemological structure that can empower agency and meaning-making. John Stuhr
argues that, while the endeavor toward and spirit of identity thinking is damaging to
human relations and agency, the doom predicted by Adorno as the result of identity
thinking is less pronounced because the nature of the human encounter with the world is
actually non-dialectical (Stuhr 2003). Percy’s alienation, the net result, is ultimately the
same, but the ways we understand the possibilities for melioristic work and positive
change, i.e. agency, are very different. The best of what we know about how humans
learn, and, thus, make meaning and become effective agents tells us that subject and
object, immanence and transcendence are not actually part of our lived experience, but
are, instead, conceptual fabrications that we impose on our experience after the fact. John
Dewey refers to this tendency as “the philosophical fallacy”. In truth, our learning is
much more contextual than even a dialectical structure allows; meaning that the opposites
of subject and object, immanence and transcendence are always already part of each other
within a given situation-act, i.e. subject and object do not constitute non-identity (the
essential ingredient for a dialectical relationship), but, instead, constitute different senses
of a unified conceptualized situation-act. In this way – and in the tradition of Piagetian
genetic psychology, Deweyan/Jamesian radical empiricism, Merleau-Ponty’s nondualistic materialism, and Nietzschean/Foucauldian Genealogy – knowing is part and
parcel of acting. Moving to a non-dialectical structure of thought – a postmodern and
pragmatic, i.e. post-metaphysical, anti-foundational, and anti-representational structure
of thought – opens doors for emancipation and agency that were not previously there.
We Understand the World by Changing It
The common thread of knowing being part and parcel of acting fundamentally
shifts the way we should understand structure and agency: agency framed this way, as
part of knowing, is no longer simply in a reciprocal relationship with structure, but is now
in a mutually-constitutive, reciprocal relationship. We find ourselves in a place where
knowing is no longer about certainty – as it has been since Greek thought surmounted
Hebrew philosophy/theology – but is, instead, a kind of action/agency; knowing is both a
product and producer of action. As Chris Hoadley says about Design-Based Research,

“Design-Based Research boils down to trying to understand the world by trying to
change it” (2005).
Knowing framed this way is postmodern and pragmatic: it becomes a kind of
contextualism that is post-metaphysical, anti-foundational, anti-representational and
enables a kind of meaning-making and meaningful perception that saturates language and
tools while, at the same time, that same meaning-making and meaningful perception
seeps through and constitutes perception. Being post-metaphysical – deeply imbedded in
context, anti-foundational – deeply sensitive to historical and sociological shifts, and antirepresentational – deeply constructed by human interaction, agency and meaning-making
are much more creative than they are alienated. Moving towards a notion of learning that
is transformative and focused on meaning-making, we can recognize that the modern
epistemology informing notions of agency does little to help us understand this process.
Modern epistemology is split between the empiricist and the rationalist camps, but the
only real difference between them, as is also true of the difference between behaviorists
and cognitivists, is whether the world or the mind makes the larger contribution to
knowledge. The fruits of the interface of pragmatism and postmodernism, and the best of
contemporary research into how we learn, tell us that the actual nature of our experience
is anything but dualistic. Our learning is more like a gestalt than memorizing a
vocabulary list. Additionally, it becomes clearer that rationality and meaning develop
within a situation rather than in the dialectical movement between the separate parts of
this dualism. The upshot of this anti-metaphysical, anti-foundational epistemology is that
“action” gets us very close to the “emancipation” of critical pedagogy and the
“reconstruction of experience” in American Pragmatism.
What does it mean for rationality and meaning to develop within a situation?:
because we are living, breathing creatures, we cannot be understood as existing in a
distinct way apart from our environment. For John Dewey, human nature is part and
parcel of nature in the broader sense, i.e. we live through our environment. As he says in
Experience and Nature (1958): “[A] living organism and its life processes involve a
world or nature temporally and spatially external to itself but internal to its functions”
(212). We cannot function, we cannot be who or what we are, without these things that
are external to us participating in our lives in an internal way. We cannot, for example,
chew without food or become human without other people. Experience, then, is simply
what happens when we function. The catch is that our functioning cannot be understood
unless we recognize the initial unity of transaction between human nature and the rest of
nature. It is only upon reflection, upon analysis and abstraction, that we can
discriminate between organism and environment. This initial non-dialectical unity is the
foundation of activity theory and human meaning-making.
With this non-dualistic understanding of experience and situations, Dewey has
bound the self up with the possibilities within objects and situations. Quite literally,
meaning is created only by the transaction of one with the other. They cannot be
understood apart from each other and it is only by virtue of the initial transaction that we
can subsequently discriminate between organism and environment. Within the
transaction, within the binding up of self with situation, of human nature with nature,
experience is primarily a qualitative event, not reducible to easily digestible and easily
calculated bits of sense-data. It is characterized by a certain quality which is felt before it
is engaged cognitively. Emotions and intuition direct our attention and thus control the

participating elements of an experience. Our rational tools engage the situation only after
we have intuited the quality of that situation and only after our emotions have directed us
to what is most interesting in that situation. (Dewey, 1960). In other words, the
qualitative nature of experience, the intuitive and emotional element of experience,
controls the learning situation – what is learned and how we learn it – to a greater extent
than any rational process or internal cognitive structure or stimuli in the external
environment. Moving us beyond the contradiction at the heart of the alienation and
enlightenment rationality, Dewey does profound justice to the irreducibly human
characteristic of learning. Even more profound than this, though, is how the pervasive
moral element bleeds into the entire process. Learning can never be value neutral
because it is socially constructed. Our natural laws and our truths – the very things that
we seek to learn – are the products of the learning process. There is, for example, no
gravity that is not already somebody’s gravity. Within experience, within the transaction,
cognitive meanings emerge when reflection goes to work on precognitive activities and
feelings. We learn when we can reconstruct experience to make a backward and forward
connection between what was done, putting one’s finger in a flame for example, and what
was suffered as a consequence of that doing, the pain suffered after the burn. This
reconstruction of experience is shot through with social and political influences, and we
can reconstruct experience in a way that facilitates growth or we can reconstruct
experience in a way that leaves our actions uncoordinated.
In separate papers written for the Society for the Advancement of American
Philosophy, John Stuhr and Charles Hobbs frame knowledge in a way that circumvents
the traditional structure and agency dualism by building on emergent themes in
pragmatism and postmodernism. When we move beyond the spectator theory of
knowledge to a more contextual understanding of knowing that is more about the mutual
constitution of knowledge within the situation-act (mutually constituted within the act of
perception, by the perceiver and the perceived), agency is liberated from the need to
transcend the immanence of the “dialectic of enlightenment” and instead becomes
something like William James’ “will to believe”/”Nietzsche’s will to power” in which we
quite literally create the world in which we know-act by the way we conceptualize the
situation-act. What we have is agency constituted through the speech-act, not by the
speech-act. In other words, the important thing is not the simple fact that the speech-act
happened, but that as the speech-act happens, we are changing-knowing the world.
Again, this is a kind of contextualism that is post-metaphysical, anti-foundational, antirepresentational and enables a kind of meaning-making and meaningful perception that
saturates language and tools while, at the same time, meaning-making and meaningful
perception seep through and constitute perception.
Akin to Freire’s “naming the world” and “conscientization,” this holistic
understanding of learning is not a new perspective. Peter Sawchuck makes this
point while arguing for a different understanding of technology training for
workers: in his research,
“[w]e see that the apparent problem of a technological underclass is less a reflection of
the availability of equipment or people’s cognitive abilities than a matter of their access
to stable cultural communities that recognize and build upon the social standpoints of
their members, which in turn provides a voice, opportunities and, power for these
communities” (2003).

Based on his research, Sawchuck sees training problems within a community of
workers as a lack of meaning-making mechanisms rather than as a problem of
tools, intelligence, or capacity. The problem is not one of structure, nor one of
agency; instead, the problem is one of misguided activity. Building on the nondialectical social theory above, this theoretical foundation is a kind of social
constructivism, some of the best of which is currently being researched as
“activity theory,” but takes as its source and inspiration the philosophies of John
Dewey, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault.
We are not spectators; we are participants who must care for the future because
we are formed, created, and constructed by that future, and therefore we should act so as
to secure the best possible consequences. In every experience, every transaction, we are
bound up with our environment, and can, thus, shape the outcome of that experience even
as we are shaped by that very same experience. In denying the dualistic assumptions of
the cognitivists and the behaviorists, the fruits of the pragmatists and postmodernists
point us toward an understanding of learning that makes us accountable for the quality of
the world in which we live. Keeping in mind the important analysis offered by the
Frankfurt School and supported by Percy’s notion of the human alienation, the theory of
human action evident in the intersection of pragmatism and postmodernism, and clarified
more in activity theory, presents a useful integration of agency and structure; an
integration that could fulfill this ethical vision of learning, meaning-making, and
empowerment.
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